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During, and most especially after the death of the Buddha, 
there existed much confusion and speculation regarding Buddhist 
doctrines of rebirth. The theoretical and philosophical aspects 
of the concepts of rebirth were among the concerns of these 
Buddhists. How could one be reborn if one ~id not have a self? 
How did one's karma affect the circumstances of one's rebirth? 
On another level, there was much debate over the mechanics of 
rebirth. How does one's karma trigger rebirth if there is no 
transmigration? Is there an intermediate state of being between 
death and life, and if so, what form did this state take? 
Some schools did not approach the philosophical problems of 
rebirth. Taking the teachings of karma and rebirth as true based 
on accounts of extra-sensory verification by Gautama Buddha and 
others (Hick 349), these chose to concentrate on the practical 
aspects of practice in the here-and-now rather than to tie up 
valuable time and energy in intellectual nit-picking. 
Still other schools banked on rebirth, so to speak, finding 
in it the key to eventual liberation. 
In an attempt to display the range of concerns and interests 
regarding rebirth, I plan to make a brief and sampled survey of a 
few select schools and sects of Buddhism. More emphasis will be 
placed on Indian Buddhism as it was here that much of the debates 
raged and were settled for the descendent forms of Buddhism in 
other parts of the globe, namely China and Japan. Special 
consideration will be given, however, to Tibetan and Pure Land 
schools as their understandings of or interest in rebirth vary 
significantly from that of traditional Indic-Buddhist views. 
While contemporary scholars, particularly those in the West, have 
begun to tackle the karma and rebirth debates once again, adding 
to the fray scientific reasoning, I will not be addressing their 
efforts here. 
THE INDIC DEBATES 
No-Sel:C a:nd Rebi:r"Ul 
It is important to the study of rebirth that frequently it 
is asked, What it is that is reborn if not the Self (atman)? And 
since there is no Self, but only bundled aggregates, one wonders 
if it is the aggregates that are reborn and then to what extent 
those aggregates which continue to arise in a separate life 
constitute the same personal entity which existed in the former 
life. (The precise relation between the aggregates and the 
personal entity was thoroughly explored by the later Indic 
Madyamaka school, the theories of which are detailed later in 
this paper.) 
First, let us look at the earlier Indic schools which 
determined that death and rebirth as we generally know it were 
not really different than momentary death and rebirth. 
There are many students of Buddhist thought who have few 
problems accepting intellectually the Buddhist doctrine of 
Patitya-Samutpada, co-conditioned origination, which involves the 
concept of momentary birth and death, and the interconnected 
simultaneous arising of the five skandhas. A greater 
intellectual leap-of-faith, so to speak, is required in extending 
this understanding to the link between one's death and subsequent 
rebirth. 
Looking more closely, in a given ordinary moment of our 
life, our present actions give rise to, that is condition, the 
following moment. The actions performed during this instant of 
existence bear their fruits in the context of a complex and 
intertwining set of karmic activity originating not only with the 
individual her or himself, but with the entire environment s/he 
interacts with. Because of this, any given act's consequences 
will be shaped by this tremendous interconnectedness of other 
actions and their consequences. A certain sense of homogeny of 
existence is thus maintained. Most actions one performs will not 
drastically alter the general conditions of existence and thus 
contiguity and continuity is easily perceived, and usually 
expected. (The problem lies with the fact that this very 
continuity is mistaken as a Self or atman.) 
Just as the differing individual frames of a motion picture 
appear to follow, or even flow, one into another and make sense, 
each individual instant of existence appears to follow or flow 
one into another. The conditions of one moment in our everyday 
lives are so similar to the conditions of the next that the 
casual causal relationship is evident. This momentary death and 
rebirth is easily validated. 
Specifically, the individual personal entity which dies and 
is reborn every moment is made up more or less of it's five 
intimately intertwined skandhas in interaction with the 
surrounding environment. At the point of biological death, this 
association dissolves. Poussin defines death in the Buddhist 
perspective as 
the dissociation of the organism constituted at birth 
to experience the fruits of a certain set of actions . 
. death marks the end of this homogeneous renewing 
[of momentary existence]: it is the separation of the 
constituent elements of the pseudo-individual, the 
dissociation of the elements (skandha) , i.e. of the 
gross elements (mahabhuta, rupakaya) and of the 
vijnana, or intellect. (Poussin 447) 
With biological death the physical form, one's body, ceases 
to function in a manner which will support the arising of all of 
the other constituent parts. Let's study this in more detail. 
The first skandha, Matter, makes up our physical form. The 
second skandha, Sensations, which are "experienced through the 
contact of physical and mental organs with the external world" 
(Rahula 20), is dependent upon the first, as the physical and 
mental organs are made of matter. The third skandha, 
Perceptions, which "recognize objects whether physical or mental" 
and "are produced through the contact of our six faculties with 
the external world" (Rahula 21), dependents upon the second (and 
therefor the first) as sensations must exist to be perceived. 
The fourth skandha, Mental Formations, "include all volitional 
activities" (Rahula 22). As volitional activities arise due to 
attachments to objects, and attachments can only occur where 
objects are perceived, Mental Formations are dependant upon the 
third skandha (and thus on the first and second). The Fifth 
skandha, Consciousness, is simply awareness. 
The Buddha declared in unequivocal terms that 
consciousness depends on matter, sensation, perception 
and mental formations, and that it cannot exist 
independently of them" (Rahula 25). 
So, as the body dies, sensory organs cease to function, 
perceptions come to an end, and mental formations.based on 
perceptions discontinue to arise. This leaves consciousness to 
condition rebirth. 
But the connection between this death consciousness and the 
birth consciousness is much more difficult to comprehend than 
that between momentary death and rebirth. This is because the 
moment of death conditions a following state of existence that is 
dramatically different than that of the "ordinary" day-to-day 
existence one knows to be her or his life. Going back to the 
analogy of the motion picture, the casual causal relationship 
between theses two moments would be as difficult to comprehend as 
story line of a Humphrey Bogart movie to which a Whoopi Goldberg 
movie had been spliced. Both continuity and contiguity are not 
as readily apparent. 
Of much dispute between the various schools of Indian 
Buddhism was the issue of an intermediate-state between the 
moment of death and the moment of rebirth (McDermott 170). Let 
us first take a very brief look at a few of those schools which 
believed in an intermediate state of existence. 
According to Bareau, the Saravastivadins, Sammatiyas, and 
Purvasailas believed firmly in an intermediate existence that 
linked death and rebirth (449). In addition, the Vatsiputriyas 
also held a belief in an intermediate existence between death and 
rebirth, but their conception of this existence varied greatly 
from the others, as we shall see. The Theravadins and 
Mahasamghikas, on the other hand, firmly denied all forms of 
intermediate existence (Bareau 449). 
Representative of a number of schools believing in 
intermediate existence is the Sarvastivadins. Vasubandhu, in his 
Sarvastivadin years, argued that between the moment of death and 
the moment of rebirth, each of which are made up the five 
aggregates, is the karmically determined antara bhava, also made 
up of the five skandhas. This is said to arise in the place of 
death and carry the "configuration of the future being" 
(McDermott 171-172). 
Vasubandhu at that point held that rebirth takes place in 
the following manner: The fairly substantial and conscious 
antara bhava, possessing both a "divine eye" and a "fully 
developed set of sexual organs" sees its parents joined in 
intercourse and becomes aroused by the scene. It becomes 
desirous of one of the parents (the father, if female and the 
mother, if male) and jealous of the other parent. Thus, out of 
this desire and hatred, it becomes attached in the womb, where it 
conditions the first moment of "birth existence" (pratisamdhi) 
(McDermott 170-172). 
The early school of the Vatsiputriyas, or Pudgalavadins 
(McDermott 168), which developed from the Sthavira school, 
also believed in an intermediate state of being. However, while 
the intermediate being explained by Vasubandhu consisted solely 
of a bundle of five aggregates, the Vatsiputriyas' intermediate 
being did not. They believed, rather, 
in the existence of a "person" (pudgala) who is neither 
identical to the five aggregates (skandhas) that make 
up the living being nor different from them; [and 
existing] neither within these five aggregates nor 
outside them. . [T]his "person" lives on from one 
existence to the next, thus ensuring the continuing 
identities of the agent of an act and.of the being who 
suffers its effects in this life or the next. (Bareau 
448) 
In other words, the pudgala does not undergo change. It 
does not die to be reborn in each conscious moment. Yet, 
ineffably, it is neither true that it remains the same from one 
instant to the next (McDermott 169). This view was unique among 
the early Buddhist schools, and the hypothesis of the pudgala was 
rejected by all other sects as being a "disguised" concept of 
atman, though the Vatsiputriyas maintained that it was not 
(Bareau 448). 
The Theravadin school, which still survives to this day, 
denied the possibility of an intermediate state, and explained 
the process of rebirth in terms of "rebirth-linking (patisandhi) 
of the present state with the immediately preceding . state 
of becoming (McDermott 169)." The Theravadin figure Buddhaghosa 
posited that in the normal experience of death the sense 
faculties fail one by one, leaving only the consciousness 
supported only by "the heart-basis". The very last instant of 
consciousness before death (the cuti vinnana) karmically 
conditions the very first instant of consciousness, the 
(patisandhi vinnana) which occurs at the time of conception. 
Thus, nothing is carried over. Rather the relationship 
between the cuti vinnana and the patisandhi vinnana is analogous 
to the relationship between a seal and wax: the seal and the 
impression it leaves in the wax are obviously not the same 
entity, but the impression is very much caused, or conditioned by 
the seal. This results in the impression, which takes on the 
same shape, or qualities, of the seal. Thus nothing, including 
the karma itself, transmigrates. Instead, 
What was reborn was not an entity, but an evolving 
consciousness, whose quality had been conditioned by 
karma. Furthermore, karma was understood to be more 
than just acts and deeds in anyone life. It was above 
all the volition that stood behind those deeds. 
(Mathews 125) 
Determinism, Retribution, Karma, and -the Middle Way 
It is because of this volitional element that the theories 
of karmic retribution found in some texts puzzle some scholars. 
The natural or physical elements of one's environment usually 
cannot be traced to volitional actions. A rock warming up as 
sunlight hits it may be a karmic process, but there is no 
volition involved. While social and economic conditions arise 
from people's volitional actions, and although an individual is 
linked somewhat to that arising due to their participation in the 
various social and economic institutions (the Chinese Hua-Yen 
School was particularly aware of this), the link is not a direct 
one. 
Karma provided tendencies or conditions rather than 
consequences as such. • • • If anything could be said 
to be predetermined, it was the physical environment 
that can give rise, or not give rise, to opportunity. 
Canonical Buddhism recognized apart from karma, other 
forces that affect causality. These included 
biological laws, accident and attack. It would be 
incorrect to assume that dukkha or sukha (pleasure) 
were the product only of one's karma or actions. 
(Mathews 125-6) . 
To illustrate, in the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta, "unstable 
social and economic conditions are said to be conducive to crime" 
(Mathews 139). To say that a person who is the victim of a crime 
is suffering retribution for a crime that slhe committed in the 
past would be incorrect, as the cause of the crime is more linked 
to the criminal's past conduct, and to the greater social and 
economic conditions at large, than it is to the victim's past 
actions. Although it can be argued that the victim helped 
somewhat to condition the occurrence of the crime by 
participating in the social and economic processes, that this 
participation would be enough for retribution of this scale to 
occur, it would follow that all would be the victims of such 
crime. 
The other problem of belief in retribution is that it leans 
towards a deterministic understanding of the karmic process. It 
is certain that the Buddha's teachings did not support 
deterministic views. Given these arguments, it can be assumed 
that when the Buddha spoke of karmic retribution, he may have 
been addressing audiences for which such a lesson would have been 
most useful (upaya). 
So how then is this related to rebirth? How is it that past 
actions affect the present moment and future moments, especially 
those occurring in the next life, in a way that is not 
deterministic? How is karma not-yet-expended "carried" into the 
next life? 
In the Theravadin Abhidamma, karma was seen as "a continuum, 
a process interpenetrating and spanning past, present, and future 
occasions" (Mathews 127). Here karma is existent not as a 
substance but as a potential. While a past act no longer exists 
as such, its potential is present in the moment at hand. For 
example, "each inspired thought process renders service to the 
next mental state, passing on the totality of its energy" 
(Mathews 127). 
It is because of this that the last thought is so integral 
to the process of rebirth. Or perhaps more accurately, as 
Mathews has pointed out, it is not necessarily the last thought, 
or death-consciousness, but rather the thought preceding and thus 
conditioning it is the most important (Mathews 130). In a person 
dying in a timely and natural manner is said to experience a 
"terminal" thought consciousness, 
which is affected by one of three thought objects: 
recent karma (either as volition and deed just 
performed, or as something that has been habitual); a 
symbolic memory of one great act, good or bad (kamma­
nimitta); or by some indication or anticipation of the 
place of rebirth (gati-nimatta). [It is] this 
experience [which] is registered by the final death­
consciousness (cuti-citta). (Mathews 129) 
It is this that has the power to enter into the 
appropriate matrix as rebirth consciousness 
(patisandhi-vinnana) , carrying with it all the surplus 
karma of the previous existence. (Mathews 130) 
The Yogacara school presented a slightly different answer to 
this issue by developing the concept of the Storehouse 
consciousness (Alaya-Vijnana). This is one of the six types of 
consciousness making up the aggregate (skandha) of consciousness 
(vijnana). It is roughly similar to the Western notion of the 
subconscious in that it has influence on one's actions but is 
unknowable by ordinary humans. This consciousness serves as a 
receptacle of karmic "seeds" (bijas), or energies generated by 
one's actions. According to Weinstein, 
Like the other types of consciousness, the alaya is 
impermanent, reproducing itself, as do the seeds that 
comprise it, from one moment to the next. It differs 
from the other six types of consciousness, which are 
readily discernible, in that it is fully cognizable 
only to Buddhas. .(177) 
The precise functioning and nature of the alaya was debated 
heavily among ¥ogacara scholars in the 6th and 7th centuries 
C.E., the most influential of which was Dharmapala (530-561 
C.E.), as it was his interpretation which was transmitted to 
China where it was adopted and further developed by Chi, or 
K'uei-chi, "into the doctrinal system subsequently called Fa­
hsiang (Jpn., Hosso)" (Weinstein 178). 
This doctrinal system divided the aggregate of vijnana 
into eight types rather than six. Fa-hsiang counted the alaya as 
the eighth of these, and held that it 
receives the effects of all good and evil acts, whether 
physical, verbal, or mental, and stores them as 
"seeds." When the appropriate conditions are in place, 
these seeds, as the word implies, produce their own 
effects, which are manifested as the unique 
psychological and physical makeup of each being. The 
realm and conditions of rebirth are likewise determined 
by the mixture of seeds stored in the -vijnana. 
(Weinstein 178) 
The seventh consciousness, of which ordinary beings are also 
unaware, "is that part of the mind that is turned inward, 
mistaking the for a real self (atman) , to which image it 
tenaciously clings". This consciousness, called mo-na-shih, 
fails to understand that "it essentially has no existence apart 
from the seeds (effects of acts) that it holds". This 
misunderstanding leads to the wrong belief that all beings have 
selves (atman) , which is the precise misconception at the root 
off all suffering (Weinstein 178). 
With all of the talk of mistaken idea of Self, and of the 
Consciousness as being the link between successive lives, one 
must come back to the question of what constitutes the individual 
entity which experiences these successive lives. 
The Madyamaka thinkers, among others, took up the debate on 
the relationship between the aggregates and the self (personal 
entity) in great length. Chandrakirti, in the sixth chapter of 
his Guide to the Middle Way, asserts that, 
The self is neither essentially other than the 
aggregates nor of the nature of the aggregates. It is 
not the basis of the aggregates nor does it inherently 
possess them. Rather, the self is established in 
dependence upon the aggregates. (Koller 289) 
This dependence upon the aggregates is not meant to imply 
that the self is completely other than the aggregates. But it 
would be just as incorrect to assert that the self was the same 
as the aggregates, or even the collection of aggregates. The 
Madyamaka School, also called the "Middle-Way School", sought to 
understand the self, or personal entity as lying between these 
extremes. 
Echoing the dialogue between King Milinda and Nagasena 
(Milindapanha, 25) in which Nagasena explains the concept of 
Anatman with the analogy of the chariot, Chandrakirti writes: 
Rather the self is established in dependence upon 
the aggregates. In this respect it is similar to a 
cart, for a cart is not asserted either (1) to be 
essentially other than its parts, or (2) to be 
identical with them, or (3) inherently to possess them 
or (4) to be inherently dependent upon them, or (5) to 
be the basis upon which they inherently dependant, or 
(6) to be the mere collection of them, or (7) to be 
their shape. (Koller 289) 
As the personal entity is partitive, there is no way to 
identify it solely with any of its parts; nor is it really 
possible to identify it with even the collection of the parts. 
If the mere collection of the parts were the cart, 
the collection of the same parts placed in a heap 
should also be the cart. (Koller 289) 
However, in the Madyamakakarikas, Nagarjuna says: 
Of all these actions, whether dissimilar or similar, 
belonging to certain realms, only one would arise at 
the moment of birth [of a being]. (17.17) 
Kalupahana analyzed this passage as so: 
Here, karma is presented as the connecting link between 
two lives. It is one of a myriad of karmas an 
individual may have performed, whether they be similar 
or dissimilar. The fact that only one among such 
actions of a life-time may appear at the time of the 
conception of a being and which can influence the new 
life-process is acknowledged by Nagarjuna. He could 
not have been unaware of the statement of the Buddha 
that consciousness (vijnana which is inextricably bound 
up with volitional karma) was a possible connecting 
link between two lives (Digha-Nikaya 3.105) and also of 
the emphasis placed by his fellow Buddhists on the last 
thought of the dying person (cutti-citta) as having 
influence over a new life process. (Kalupahana, 
Nagarjuna 252) 
Nagarjuna was clear that though the consciousness may be the 
link between two lives, vijnana is not itself to be mistaken as a 
Self, nor is it to be assumed that the personal entity remains 
the same during successive lives: 
The view that I existed in the past is not appropriate, 
for whosoever was in the previous birth, he, indeed, is 
not identical with his person. (27.3) (Kalupahana, 
Nagarjuna 378) 
Tibetan Schools and 'the Tibetan Book of the Dead 
The Tibetans made a thorough study of the process of death 
and rebirth. Unlike the even the Indic schools which did believe 
in an intermediate state of being, the Tibetans held that the 
intermediate state is quite long and elaborate. Like the Indic 
schools, they believed the last moment of life to be far more 
important than the intermediate state. The last moment is of 
utmost importance simply because it, more than any other moment 
of existence during one's lifetime, conditions the state of 
rebirth. Let us read again Poussin's definition of death from 
the Buddhist perspective. 
the dissociation of the organism constituted at birth 
to experience the fruits of a certain set of actions. 
• death marks the end of this homogeneous renewing 
[of momentary existence]: it is the separation of the 
constituent elements of the pseudo-individual, the 
dissociation of the elements (skandha) , i.e. of the 
gross elements (mahabhuta, rupakaya) and of the 
vijnana, or intellect. (Poussin 447) 
Because of this dissociation, any act performed at the 
instant of death will bear its fruit in a context where far fewer 
"outside" karmic constraints wiil condition the outcome. Thus a 
thought of wishing for a drink of water arising in everyday life 
will rarely have dire consequences as many factors will temper 
them. A thought of wishing for a drink of ~ater at the instant 
of death may have the result of having conditioned one's rebirth 
into a hell. 
In response to the great importance of the last instant of 
life in the conditioning the state of rebirth, Tibetan Buddhists 
developed the Bardo Thodol. 
According to Evans-Wentz, this text was thought to have been 
handed down orally for many generations before being committed to 
writing probably in the eighth century C.E., the period which 
Tantric Buddhism was taking hold in Tibet (Evans-Wentz 73-74). 
In a forward to a more recent translation, however, Chogyam 
Trungpa, Rinpoche tells us that the book was one of six in a 
series of instructions for liberations composed by Padmasambhava 
and committed to writing by his wife Yeshe Tsogyal. The Bardo 
Thodol, often called "The Tibetan Book of the Dead" because, like 
the Egyptian Book of the Dead, it was meant to be read to the 
dying to assist in the transition of death, is more accurately 
known as "Liberation By Hearing on the After-Death Plane" (Evans­
Wentz 2). 
As implied by this title, it is hoped that the words will 
help the dying to discipline their thoughts so as to eliminate 
clinging or other actions in the instant of death and in the 
stages of intermediate existence. Without such clinging, rebirth 
would not occur and thus liberation from samsara would be 
achieved. Should the individual not achieve such a state, the 
hearing of the Bardo may at least ease the transition between 
death and rebirth by informing the dying of the experiences to be 
expected during the process, and by instructing the dying in the 
mental disciplines to be practiced in the intermediate state 
which could influence the conditions for rebirth in one of the 
more favorable realms. 
Pure LfWd Buddhis.w 
Unlike most other forms of Buddhism which do not focus on 
rebirth as a central concept, Pure Land relies heavily on the 
concept of rebirth. Coupled with the belief in savior-type 
Bodhisattvas, rebirth into a "pure" land or Buddha land becomes 
the object of practice. 
Pure Land Buddhism, popular from the second century CE in 
much of northern India and Central Asia and immensely important 
even today in East and South East Asia, is geared to lay 
Buddhists who haven't either the luxury or will to "master 
clerical discipline and learning" (Andrews 1). For Pure Land 
practitioners, the possibility of the release from samsara and 
all of its sufferings and delusions lie in the promise of a 
"transmigratory rebirth into a pure land, a spiritually pure 
Buddha-realm where all conditions are conducive to spiritual 
progress and rapid advancement to enlightenment and Buddhhahood" 
(l ) . 
This belief was made poss{ble, of course, by the existence 
of the Bodhisattva Vow, "All beings, without number, I vow to 
liberate" (Kapleau 212). One popular Buddha, Amitabha (known 
variously as Dharmakara, Amita, Amida, Amitayus, A-mi-t'o-fo), 
took the Bodhisattva Vow further than most. Outlined in the 
Larger Pure Land Sutra were Forty Eight Vows. In three of these 
vows, Dharmakara (Amitabha) specifies the practice for rebirth 
into his Buddha Land; vows 18, 19, and 20: 
18 If I should become a Buddha, and sentient beings 
of the ten regions who have sincere faith and 
desire to be born in my country, [producing] 
even ten reflections, are not born there, 
excepting those who have committed the five 
irredeemable evils and maligned the tue Dharma, 
then I will not accept perfect enlightenment. 
19 If I should become a Buddha, and, when they are 
about to die, do not appear surrounded by a 
great host before the sentient beings of the ten 
regions who have aroused the enlightened mind, 
practiced various meritous works, have sincere 
faith, and have aroused their aspiration 
desiring to be born in my country, then I will 
not accept perfect enlightenment. 
20 If I should become a Buddha, and the sentient 
beings of the ten regions who hear my name, 
reflect on my country, store up a stock of 
merit, and sincerely dedicated it desiring to be 
born in my country do not achieve the result [of 
their merit dedication], then I will not accept 
perfect enlightenment. [Taisho shinshu daizokyo, 
XII, 268a-b] (Andrews 10) 
There are two ways that the practice of nembutsu is 
purported to affect the status of one's rebirth. While the 
Larger Pure Land Sutra relies on the compassion of Amitabha as 
the saving force with nembutsu being the means by which aspirants 
demonstrate their interest in a better rebirth, the Amitabha 
Contemplation Sutra holds to the belief that the practice on 
nembutsu will actually annul "bad" karma. In this sutra many of 
the contemplation exercises close with such statements as "If one 
perfects this contemplation he will cancel .fifty billion kalpas 
of samsaric sinful deeds and will surely be reborn into the Pure 
Land of Utter Bliss" [Taisho shinshu daizokyo, XII, 343b-c] 
(Andrews 15). Having had one's bad karma annulled, one would 
then become worthy of rebirth into the Pure Land. 
Both sutras agree however, that by which ever means, any 
lowly being which had not committed one of the five irredeemable 
evils namely patricide, matricide, murder of an arhat, 
injuring or killing a Buddha or disrupting the harmony of the 
monastic order (Andrews 9) -- could attain rebirth by the 
practice of nembutsu (Andrews 20). 
Interestingly, one Chinese sect of Pure Land founded by 
T'an-Iuan, the Sui-T'ang School, taught that even those who had 
committed an irredeemable sin could, with practice of the "Ten 
Reflections" be reborn into a buddha land (Andrews 23). From the 
T'an-luan Commentary: 
Although those of the lowest grades [of rebirth] cannot 
comprehend that dharmata (true reality) is unproduced, 
simply by the power derived from reciting the Buddha's 
name they produce the resolve to be reborn and aspire 
to be reborn in that land. [Taisho shinshu daizokyo 
1819.40.839b4-6] (Tanaka 70) 
In Japan, the T'ien-t'ai, or Tendai school lent much to the 
development of Pure Land doctrines. 
During Genshin's time, there existed a debate as to the 
ontological status of the pure lands and the beings which were 
able to inhabit them. Some schools held that buddha lands were 
recompense lands, reward-lands in which only buddhas and 
bodhisattvas could be born. Genshin dismissed this and other 
positions on the ontological status of the pure lands as being 
full of artificial distinctions, and maintained in his Ojoyushu 
that by means of "extreme nembutsu" most anyone can attain 
rebirth in Sukhavati, or a Pure Land (Andrews 94-95). To back 
this claim, Genshin referred to a passage in the authoritative 
Tendai text Commentary on the Vimalakirti Sutra set down by Chih­
i: 
Question: . how can those with heavy karma be 
reborn into a pure land? 
Answer: Master T'ien-T'ai [Chih-i] states: 
'Although the Land of the Buddha of Eternal Life has 
superior benefits, if at the time of death [a being 
with heavy karma] repents and reflects on the Buddha, 
his karmic obstacles will topple and he will gain 
rebirth. . .'[399 Ojoyushu] (Andrews 95) 
It is important to note the alternatives Pure Land followers 
have to being reborn into a Buddha Land. Buddhist thought as a 
whole holds that there are six possible realms into which 
sentient beings can be reborn. These are I. The Realm of Hells; 
II. The Realm of Hungry Spirits or Ghosts (Pretas); III. The 
Realm of Beasts, IV; The Realm of Angry Demons; V. The Realm of 
Human Beings; and, VI. The Realm of Heavenly Beings (Devas). 
Emphasis is given through-out Buddhism on how difficult it is to 
be born in the Human Realm, and how the tremendous opportunities 
for advancement available to humans are not to be wasted. 
If in this world we do not try to discipline ourselves 
neither will we be any better in a future world. It is 
difficult to be born as a human being in the endless 
cycle of birth and death. Even though we do obtain 
birth as a human being it is difficult to obtain the 
various faculties. And even though we may have the 
various faculties the chances are few that one will 
have an opportunity to get acquainted with Buddhism. 
And even though one gets acquainted with Buddhism it is 
difficult to obtain a heart of faith. . .(Genshin's 
60) 
And in the Hokkekyo we read: 
during the endless and numberless Kalpas it ~s 
difficult to have an opportunity to hear this Law. And 
even though this Law is heard it is difficult to become 
a human and become acquainted with Buddhism. • Now, 
therefore, in this our present life is our one chane to 
depart from this sea of suffering and to obtain birth 
in Paradise. (Genshin's 60) 
Genshin, in his Ojoyoshu goes to great lengths to study in 
gruesome detail the six realms, with particular efforts taken to 
explore the grisly horrors of the eight Hells. His purpose here 
was to instill an aversion to the six "Defiled Realms" of 
sentient existence in general as well as a deep fear of rebirth 
into one of the Hells. This aversion and fear would, it was 
hoped, motivate people to aspire to be reborn into a Buddha Land, 
or more specifically in Genshin's case, Amitabha Buddha's Pure 
Land, so as to be free of the dangers and torments of the six 
"defiled Realms" (Andrews 45). 
Conclusion 
The debate over rebirth has not died down among Buddhist, as 
evidenced by the volume of publications put out in recent years 
regarding this subject. While beyond the scope of this paper to 
survey the contemporary works, pointing to the existence of this 
literature serves to convey the complexity of the rebirth 
problems in light of the fact that Buddhism is twenty five 
centuries old. 
A general tendency can be se~n in the level of importance 
given to the rebirth debates, at least among the philosophical 
schools, as Buddhism has moved throughout the world. In India, 
possibly as a result of Hindu belief structures, the mechanics of 
rebirth were debated hotly. As related earlier, a number of 
resultant issues came forth. These included: the problem of 
rebirth without transmigration of a Soul or Self; the quarrel 
over the existence of an intermediate state of being; and the 
possibility of karmic responsibility and retribution in death, 
rebirth and subsequent lives, 
In China, where there was no prior established idea of 
rebirth, though belief in retribution of a sort was already 
established by the indigenous philosophical systems, the 
philosophical problems of rebirth were virtually overlooked while 
the theory of retribution was largely capitalized upon, most 
prominently in the Pure Land Schools. 
Japan, two major schools of Buddhist thought dominated the 
scene. As in China, Pure Land and its various offshoots in Japan 
enjoyed great prominence. The other major tradition, Zen, like 
its Chinese equivalent, Ch'an, mostly ignored rebirth to devote 
energies to the problems arising "in this very instant", in hopes 
that enlightenment could be attained before one could experience 
rebirth again. 
This concludes a very brief overview of the issues 
surrounding the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth which have been 
addressed in Asia before modern times. 
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